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Conference:  Defcon 31
Authors: Austin Emmitt Senior Security Researcher at Trellix Advanced Research Center

In 2021 the FORCEDENTRY sandbox escape introduced the usage of NSPredicate in an iOS exploit. This new technique allowed attackers to sidestep codesigning, ASLR, and all other mitigations to execute arbitrary code on Apple devices. As a result, Apple put in place new restrictions to make NSPredicate less powerful and less useful for exploits. This presentation will cover new research showing that these added restrictions could be completely circumvented in iOS 16, and how NSPredicates could be exploited to gain code execution in many privileged iOS processes. This technical deep dive will be a rare instance of iOS security that anyone can comprehend without years of experience. After an overview of the classes involved, we will explore the full syntax of NSPredicate and cover how it can be used to script the Objective-C runtime and even call any C function. It will be shown that PAC can still be bypassed 100% reliably with NSPredicates in order to execute any function with arbitrary arguments. A new tool will be unveiled to help craft complex NSPredicates to execute arbitrary code and inject those predicates in any application. Additionally, a demonstration will be given which executes arbitrary code in the highly privileged Preferences app. Finally, the talk will cover a bypass of NSPredicateVisitor implementations which allows a malicious process to evaluate any NSPredicate within several system processes including coreduetd, appstored, OSLogService, and SpringBoard. Next there will be a live demo of exploiting SpringBoard to steal a user’s notifications and location data. The presentation will end with some discussion about what can still be done with NSPredicates now that these issues have been fixed, including bypassing App Store Review, and what app developers should know to keep their own apps safe.
Conference:  Defcon 31
Authors: Ron Ben-Yizhak Security Researcher at Deep Instinct

Privilege escalation is a common attack vector in the Windows OS. Today, there are multiple offensive tools in the wild that can execute code as “NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM” (Meterpreter, CobaltStrike, Potato tools), and they all usually do so by duplicating tokens and manipulating services in some way or another. This talk will show an evasive and undetected privilege escalation technique that abuses the Windows Filtering Platform (WFP). This platform processes network traffic and allow configuring filters that permit or block communication. It is built-in component of the operating system since Windows Vista, and doesn’t require an installation My research started from reverse-engineering a single RPC method in an OS service and ended with several techniques to abuse a system kernel component, that allow executing programs as “NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM”, as well as other users that are logged on the the machine without triggering any traditional detection algorithms. The various components of the Windows Filtering Platform will be analyzed, such as the Basic Filtering Engine, the TCPIP driver and the IPSec protocol, while focusing on how to abuse them and extract valuable data from them.